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Abstract 
In this paper, I study the application of phylogenetic analysis in evolutionary 
archaeology. I show how transfer of this apparently general analytic tool is affected 
by salient differences in disciplinary context. One is that archaeologists, unlike many 
biologists, do not regard cladistics as a tool for classification, but are primarily 
interested in explanation. The other is that explanation is traditionally sought in terms 
of individual-level rather than population-level mechanisms. The latter disciplinary 
difference creates an ambiguity in the application and interpretation of phylogenetic 
analyses. Moreover, I argue that, while archaeologists have claimed that “cladistics is 
useful for reconstructing artefact phylogenies” (O’Brien et al. 2001), these 
reconstructions only contribute minimally to the explanatory research agenda of 
evolutionary archaeology. 
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1. Darwinizing culture: global and local revolutions 
Evolutionary theory is outgrowing its natural habitat. Many researchers outside 
biology frame their questions and results in evolutionary terms, and propose 
counterparts to mechanisms and entities that are central to our understanding of the 
organic world. Thus, historians and economists discuss how introducing a genotype-
phenotype distinction helps to describe technological change (e.g., Ziman 2000) and 
engineers claim that solutions of design problems may evolve by natural selection 
(e.g., Bentley 1999). 
This ‘second Darwinian revolution’ has not escaped philosophical scrutiny. 
Philosophers of science have examined, for instance, which explanatory role could 
conceivably be played by evolutionary mechanisms with respect to social processes 
(Sober 1991) or the spread of religious ideas (Sterelny 2006). The question that drives 
most of this work is whether there is, given the existence and success of alternative 
accounts, any explanatory work done by or left to do for evolutionary accounts of 
culture and technology. The critical focus is on general theories of cultural evolution, 
such as dual-inheritance theory or memetics (see Laland and Brown 2002 for a useful 
survey). 
Not all extensions of Darwinism takes this global form. Much consists of 
selective applications, to specific disciplinary problems, of tools or techniques taken 
from evolutionary biology. Research papers in evolutionary economics, engineering 
and archaeology rarely mention general frameworks such as dual-inheritance theory 
and only occasionally discuss the possibilities of defining suitably general 
evolutionary concepts. Instead, the results reported are gained by applying specific 
tools and techniques. Economists have, for example, adopted Lotka-Volterra models 
to study how technological change affects competition between firms (e.g., Saviotti 
1995); and archaeologists and anthropologists have recently started using 
phylogenetic analysis to reconstruct tool traditions. The latter efforts will be the 
subject of this paper. 
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Applications of evolutionary tools outside biology raise methodological 
problems which have been largely ignored by philosophers of science. Critical 
responses are instead brought forward locally, by researchers within the discipline 
who favour a non-evolutionary approach. One objection is found throughout the 
literature, although the details vary with the evolutionary tool being questioned. 
Critics maintain that culture and technology essentially involve human beliefs and 
intentions. From this, they conclude that evolutionary tools, such as replicator 
dynamics or phylogenetic reconstruction, structurally misrepresent the phenomena. A 
standard response is to point out that, although methodological problems may arise in 
applying evolutionary tools to cultural phenomena, the problems are largely the same 
as those in biology. Cultural evolution is presented as ‘business-as-usual’ from a 
biological perspective: not less difficult, but also not less appropriate to the domain. 
In this paper, I develop another perspective on the application of evolutionary 
tools to Darwinize culture. Instead of focussing on structural (dis-)similarity, I 
examine how the change of disciplinary context affects the relevance of evolutionary 
tools. This leads to a detailed appreciation of the difficulties in transferring one item 
in the evolutionary toolkit from the organic to the artificial world. I first describe 
phylogenetic techniques and their application in archaeology (section 2). Although 
phylogenetic reconstructions are strictly speaking neutral tools to analyse similarity 
relations between items, I go on to show that the relevance conditions set by the 
disciplinary context differentiate applications of these tools in archaeology from those 
in biology. In archaeology, these reconstructions are supposed to contribute to a 
primarily explanatory project (section 3), which conceals an important ambiguity 
regarding the type of explanation sought – and to which, given our present knowledge 
of (evolutionary) mechanisms underlying design and use practices, the construction of 
tool trees contributes little (section 4). I also offer suggestions regarding a productive 
research agenda and the role of phylogenetic reconstructions therein. 
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2. Trees of tools: How phylogenetics came to archaeology 
Before describing the use of phylogenetic analyses in archaeology, some words about 
the technique in general. One of Darwin’s central insights was that of the common 
ancestry of (all of) life. All 
biological species are related by 
sharing, somewhere in their part, 
common ancestral species. The 
historical relations within any set of 
species can therefore be represented 
by a branching, tree-like structure, 
from the ancestor they all share at 
the root to the topmost branching 
points at which one finds (more 
recent) ancestors shared by only two 
species. A sample phylogenetic tree, 
for five species, is given in Figure 1. 
All species share a common ancestor 
(F
*
) and species A and B share a 
more recent common ancestor (G
*
) 
than species A and D (H
*
). 
Various techniques exist for reconstructing phylogenetic trees. Most are based 
on morphological characteristics of the species studied,
1
 typically called “states” of 
“characters”. States can be discrete or continuous; in practice, continuous states are 
often turned into discrete ones by introducing cut-off points. Sample characters are 
feeding habits (with states “carnivorous”, “herbivorous” and “omnivorous”) or adult 
wingspan (with continuous states and a cut-off point at one metre). Starting from 
these characteristics, a number of methods have been developed to infer phylogenies, 
most of which are implemented in software packages. A popular choice, the most 
popular among archaeologists, is the “maximum parsimony” method, implemented in 
PAUP (Swofford 2002). This reconstructs the tree by finding the minimum number of 
evolutionary events that can account for the observed characteristics – roughly 
                                                 
1
 In biology, phylogenetic reconstruction is increasingly based on molecular rather than morphological 
data. Some authors (e.g., Ridley 2004, Ch.16) therefore distinguish ‘molecular phylogenetics’ from 
(morphology-based) ‘cladistics’. Evolutionary archaeologists use cladistics more broadly, to denote any 
method of phylogenetic reconstruction, and exclusively use morphological data. 
Figure 1. A sample phylogenetic tree 
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speaking, it minimises the total number of character-state changes in the tree. Another 
choice is that of an outgroup, a species that is phylogenetically related to, but not 
included among, the set of species involved. This choice converts a network of 
similarities into a rooted tree, and is non-trivial because it requires prior knowledge of 
some phylogenetic relations. 
On the basis of these choices, phylogenetic analysis not only determines 
relations of common ancestry, but also identifies the character states of hypothetical 
common ancestors; in fact, the former is achieved by the latter. Thus, the result looks 
conspicuously like a family tree in which portraits are proposed for unknown 
ancestors. On the basis of the analysis, similarities between items can be distinguished 
into (at least) two classes: homologies, character states that are shared between items 
and their common ancestor; and homoplasies, states that are shared between items, 
but not with their most recent common ancestor.
2
 To give an example: the wings of 
parrots and eagles are homologous, whereas parrot wings and bat wings are 
homoplasious. 
It is difficult to assess independently the outcome of phylogenetic analyses: 
data are typically scarce, and relations of ancestry are not directly observable. One 
thing that distinguishes parsimony-based cladograms from systematically generated 
historical narratives is that there are two measures of quality: the ‘consistency’ and 
‘retention’ indexes of the cladogram. These numbers measure how well the data fit 
the branching structure ‘imposed’ on it in phylogenetic analysis;
3
 the measured 
quantity is sometimes described as the strength of the phylogenetic signal in the data 
set. The more homoplasies are needed to reconstruct the relations of common ancestry 
between the items, the lower the signal and the indexes. 
 
Parsimony methods for phylogenetic reconstructions are well-established in 
systematic biology, and have also been applied in other disciplines, like linguistics 
and archaeology. In archaeology, the application takes the shape of reconstructing 
‘tool traditions’, lineages of artefacts that are roughly functionally equivalent. 
                                                 
2
 Whether phylogenetic analyses provide independent evidence for the homology-analogy distinction, 
let alone sufficient evidence, is a thorny issue. It is left aside in this paper, because it intuitively affects 
applications in biology as much as those in archaeology. 
3
 The consistency index (CI) is the ratio between the minimum possible number of character changes 
and the number of changes on the resulting tree. The retention index (RI) is a slightly more complicated 
ratio that does not depend on the size of the data set. The differences between these indexes are 
irrelevant for the purpose of this paper. 
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Although more qualitative reconstructions were suggested earlier (see, e.g., Basalla 
1988), a rigorous application of parsimony-based phylogenetic analysis is of recent 
date (O’Brien et al. 2001). It involves the choices described above: characters and 
states, outgroup and analytic method (parsimony).
4
 The result, shown in Figure 2, is a 
cladogram for paleoindian projectile points found in the Southeastern Basin of the 
United States. It shows the lineage of seventeen classes of these points, including their 
common ancestors (on the branching points). The boxes on the lines represent 
character-state changes, differentiated by type: open boxes are unique changes in the 
ancestral state; shaded boxes represent state changes that occur more than once; and 
half-shaded boxes are reversals to the ancestral state.  
Recently, the phylogenies of other tool traditions and artefact lineages, 
including Copador ceramics and Turkmen textiles, have been reconstructed.
5
 This 
                                                 
4
 Another choice is to focus on the characters of artefacts instead of those of, e.g., use practices or 
larger cultural units. This is controversial, also among evolutionary archaeologists. 
5
 Mace et al. (2005) and Lipo et al.(2006) provide (references to) more examples of phylogenetic 
reconstructions in archaeology. 
Figure 2. A cladogram for paleoindian projectile-points (from: O’Brien et 
al. 2001: 1132) 
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adoption of the technique has also triggered criticisms from fellow archaeologists and 
anthropologists. Their objections fit the template described above. In particular, it has 
been pointed out that the tree of technology cannot have the neat branching structure 
of the tree of life. Rather, it should show many intersections of lineages due to 
blending or reticulation of cultural/tool traditions. One cause of this blending would 
be “pervasive theft of ideas”, as one critic, Niles Eldredge (introduction to Lipo et al. 
2006: xvi), has put it: human beings, including artisans, imitate each other easily and 
often. Applying cladistics would therefore give a distorted or incomplete 
representation of the history of culture and technology. 
Advocates of artefact phylogenetics defend their approach with an “as-in-
nature” argument; in this case, a comparison of the quality of phylogenetic analyses in 
systematic biology and those in anthropology and archaeology (Collard et al. 2006). 
The consistency and retention indexes for ‘cultural’ cladograms lie in the same range 
as those in nature, meaning that cladistic techniques are as appropriate to cultural 
phenomena as they are to biological species: cladistics misrepresents the tree of 
technology as much (or little) as it misrepresents the tree of life. Since archaeologists 
face the same methodological choices as systematic biologists, there is structural and 
methodological similarity between cultural and natural evolution. 
A remarkable illustration of the stalemate to which this focus on structural 
(dis-) similarities has led is the application of phylogenetic techniques to two types of 
musical instruments (Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007). This application is intended to 
show how a branching structure misrepresents the actual history of these instruments, 
which has a much more reticulated structure. Advocates of artefact phylogenetics 
have welcomed this intended reductio as a result; they emphasise that the retention 
index of, for instance, the Baltic psaltery cladogram lies just below the ‘cultural 
average’ – which is equal to the biological average. A non-partisan presentation 
mentions spearheads, textiles and musical instruments on a par, as items for which 
“phylogenetic trees have been constructed” (Venditti and Pagel 2008). 
 
 
3. Clades in classification and explanation 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that tool trees are indeed structurally similar to 
the tree of life, and in reconstructing the former one faces the same methodological 
choices and dilemmas as in reconstructing the latter. This equivalence would leave 
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room for another type of criticism. To put it metaphorically: the consistency and 
retention ‘scores’ of trees of tools and of life may be the same – but are archaeologists 
and biologists playing the same game in applying cladistics? In this section and the 
next, I show how the application of cladistic techniques in archaeology is affected by 
its disciplinary context, which is different from that in biology. 
One difference concerns the broader aim of phylogenetic analyses – the reason 
why researchers in a discipline are interested in trees. In biology, the relevance of 
cladistics lies in large part in their use for systematics, i.e., for the correct 
classification of living items into groups. Phylogenetic analyses contribute directly to 
determining the historical relations between these groups, which are of obvious 
importance in their classification and, arguably, in their nomenclature. Indeed, 
“cladistics” not only indicates a popular type of (parsimony-based) phylogenetic 
analysis, but also an approach to the classification of living items – showing a close 
association between the analysis and its expected relevance. Consequently, many 
applications of and discussions regarding the analyses concern revisions of traditional 
classifications (e.g., Mayr 1981; Hull 1988). One example is the classification of birds 
and various dinosaur species. Cladistics has been used to determine historical 
relations between these species, which has contributed significantly to the ongoing 
debate about the evolution of birds from dinosaur-like, lizard-like or other ancestral 
species. 
Phylogenetic analyses are not exclusively applied for classification. As the 
origin-of-birds example shows, issues of classification are connected to explanations, 
e.g., of the evolutionary “events” identified in the phylogenetic analysis. Another 
application is in phylogenetic comparative methods (e.g., Harvey and Pagel 1991), 
which are used to test correlations for independence of data – and thus to evaluate 
hypotheses about the adaptation of species to their environment or the co-evolution of 
traits. 
However, phylogenetic analyses would be relevant to biology even if they 
would contribute only minimally to explanatory projects. Archaeologists are, by 
contrast, uninterested in classification. Most regard any system of distinguishing 
artefact kinds – or, more generally, cultural kinds – as “conventional” or interest-
dependent. As an influential textbook puts it: “Types, assemblages and cultures are all 
artificial constructs designed to put order into disordered evidence (...) [D]ifferent 
classifications are needed for the different kinds of questions we want to ask” 
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(Renfrew and Bahn 2004: 118). This conventionalism has been widely accepted in 
archaeology following a debate in the 1950s about whether artefact kinds are 
discovered or constructed.
6
 
This view may be in need of critical scrutiny,
7
 but it is taken as a given about 
the disciplinary context here. It entails that archaeologists cannot find phylogenetic 
analyses relevant because it could contribute to classification: classification is 
supposed to precede analysis, not be an outcome of it. Instead, the main relevance of 
phylogenetic reconstruction may lie in its contribution to explanations. This would be 
in line with the overarching goal of the (sub-) field. A textbook describes the 
challenge for evolutionary archaeology as to “explain [processes of cultural change] 
more coherently or persuasively than hitherto” (Renfrew and Bahn 2004, p.481). This 
is underwritten by evolutionary archaeologists themselves:  
 
“The Darwinian mechanisms of selection and transmission, when incorporated 
into an explanatory theory, provide precisely what culture historians were 
looking for: the tools to begin explaining cultural lineages—that is, to 
answering why-type questions.” (O’Brien and Lyman 2002: 35) 
 
The concern with explanation is also evident in descriptions of the results of artefact 
cladistics, e.g., in the following quote: 
 
“We use cladistics because of its unique ability ... to lay out sequences of 
character-state changes. (...) The ultimate goal is to explain why side notching 
was preferred over other hafting techniques” (Darwent and O'Brien 2006: 185) 
 
The association with classification is therefore exchanged for a focus on explanation. 
This raises the question, however, how phylogenetic reconstructions contribute to 
explanations – and to which explanations they contribute. 
                                                 
6
 O'Brien and Lyman (2000, pp. 207-213) summarize this so-called ‘Ford-Spaulding’ debate. 
7
 E.g., in light of the recent debate about the realism of artefact kinds (see, e.g., the contributions by 
Elder and Thomasson to Laurence and Margolis 2007) 
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4. Two tales of tools, but not with trees 
In archaeology, advocates of evolutionary tools should prove the merits of their tools 
by answering outstanding why-questions. For artefact lineages, this explanatory 
project is thought of as consisting of two steps: first, the cladogram is constructed; 
next comes the archaeologists “truly grueling ... job” (O’Brien and Lyman 2000: 20) 
of explaining the shape of the cladogram. This process of first constructing and then 
explaining or interpreting a cladogram is echoed in more places, including the earlier 
quote about explaining cultural lineages through evolutionary mechanisms. 
In Reconstructing the Past, Elliott Sober analyses a particular kind of 
explanation that apparently underwrites this two-step process, but also shows some 
general difficulties in taking the second step. Sober (1988, p.133) notes that what he 
calls “genealogical explanations of observed character distributions” – a particular 
kind of historical explanation of varieties of characteristics in a data sample – require 
three ingredients, two of which are important in the present context: a genealogical 
hypothesis about character states; and mechanisms that explain changes of character 
states.
8
 This shows how phylogenetic reconstructions can contribute to explanations, 
since cladograms represent a genealogical hypothesis about common ancestry. It also 
shows that cladograms do not provide explanations without hypotheses about 
mechanisms for state changes. 
Archaeologists are aware that explanations cannot be read off directly from 
cladograms and that finding explanations is difficult: the full description of the second 
step in the source quoted above is “a truly grueling and often fruitless job” (O’Brien 
and Lyman 2000: 20; emphasis added). Still, the need for mechanisms raises two 
questions about the explanatory project envisaged. First, which mechanisms are 
available, in terms of background knowledge, to explain the structure of artefact 
lineages? Secondly, given the need for and perhaps choice of mechanisms, is 
constructing the cladogram independent from explaining it? 
In this section, I argue for three critical claims: that archaeologists make 
different and implicit choices regarding the level of explanation; that these choices 
affect phylogenetic reconstructions, so that the explanatory step cannot be neatly 
separated from the reconstructive step; and that, on either of the two choices regarding 
                                                 
8
 The third ingredient are “interior states”, a claim about character states of common ancestors and 
(lack of) changes in these states. 
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mechanism, phylogenetic analyses contribute little or nothing to the explanatory 
project of (evolutionary) archaeology. 
First, the ambiguity. Evolutionary archaeologists may and do seek explanatory 
mechanisms at two different levels. On the one hand, they can appeal to broad 
knowledge bases from everyday life and more systematic inquiries, including 
anthropological case studies, experimental archaeology and innovation studies. These 
sources provide information about the transmission and change of technological 
knowledge and artefacts, including training and selective communication; imitation 
and theft of ideas; independent invention and guided variation; and modularity of 
design problems and solutions. In most real-life cases, combinations of these 
mechanisms will operate, creating an overwhelming variety of possible explanatory 
mechanisms. These mechanisms focus on decisions made by individual users and 
designers of artefacts, against a social background. Moreover, the artefacts are mostly 
individual items or kinds with few members – archaeologists do not describe an era of 
mass-production.
9
 Pitched at this level, the efforts of archaeologists would resemble 
the application of cladistic techniques to the genealogy of copied texts such as The 
Canterbury Tales or chain letters (e.g., Spencer et al. 2004). The resulting textual-
tradition trees feature individual texts and may be interpreted in terms of explanatory 
mechanisms such as transcription errors, made by individual scribes, and “deliberate 
contamination” from other texts than the copied one. 
Evolutionary theory offers another set of mechanisms, such as natural 
selection and drift. These mechanisms, which operate on the population level, should 
be distinguished from various “selective forces” operating on the individual level.
10
 
Explanations in archaeology typically do not involve this population level, and it is 
not self-evident that populations of projectile points and other technical artefacts 
evolve by natural selection (more on this below). However, only if they are pitched at 
this level, the explanations given by archaeologists would resemble those given by 
evolutionary biologists. 
So which choice is made? The explanations given by evolutionary 
archaeologists, despite their self-chosen name, often reveal an overriding interest in 
                                                 
9
 Historical relations between mass-produced items may also be susceptible to an individual (artefact-
type) level of explanation, since tokens of the type are, for most practical purposes, identical. This 
raises the question – not addressed in this paper – whether artefact kinds are sufficiently like biological 
species to reconstruct their historical relations by the same methods. 
10
 Here, I follow Lewens (2004), pp.22-28 
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the individual level. For instance, in interpreting the projectile-point cladogram above, 
researchers note that: “Unfortunately, the results of cladistics cannot determine 
whether a character change represents a functional change in projectile-point design, 
nor do we have informants who can tell us why they changed a particular feature. 
However, the engineering properties of different characters can give us some insight” 
(Darwent and O'Brien 2006: 200; emphasis added). This shows that the information 
sought concerns choices made by individual projectile-point designers, much like the 
transcription errors of individual scribes. The authors note that interviews cannot 
reveal this information and go on to invoke engineering properties, e.g., material 
constraints in the design process. This invokes background knowledge that other 
archaeologists will immediately recognize – just like the individual-level interest. 
This interest also affects the construction of the cladogram, which leads to the 
second critical claim. The diagram shown in Figure 2 features seventeen classes of 
points, which appears to put the diagram at a population level. However, these classes 
have only a few members (four or more) and were chosen out of five hundred classes 
from a sample of around six hundred projectile points. Most classes therefore have 
only one member.
11
 Moreover, multiple-member kinds were not selected because of 
an interest in artefact populations, but to decrease the idiosyncrasies caused by small 
data samples. Therefore, the cladogram in Figure 2 is naturally interpreted as the 
history of individual spearheads and their makers and users: the boxes may be 
regarded as the results of instances of (combinations of) individual-level mechanisms 
such as plagiarism or guided variation under strong material constraints. Thus, it 
would seem that the individual-level interest has implicitly guided the choice of 
artefact ‘kinds’ that enter the construction of the cladogram. The two steps of the 
explanatory project only seem separable as long as the choice of explanation-level is 
left implicit. 
This may suggest that phylogenetic reconstructions of tool trees would best be 
pitched explicitly at the level of individual items and relevant selective forces. After 
all, this would fit the interest and background knowledge of archaeologists; and 
                                                 
11
 This may be interpreted as a result of scarcity of data, a problem archaeologists share with 
paleontologists. This interpretation regards items as representatives (prototypes) of a larger population 
rather than as items of individual interest. I have found no evidence in the literature that archaeologists 
chose this interpretation; if they do, their implicit explanatory pitch is at the population level, discussed 
later in the main text. 
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cladistic techniques have proven their worth in reconstructions of manuscript 
traditions, which operate on the same level. 
One consequence of this choice is that the resulting reconstruction or 
explanation is not evolutionary, because it is not populational. This does not discredit 
the explanations – many respectable historical explanations are not populational or 
Darwinist – but it does make it misleading to present the explanatory project as 
evolutionary archaeology. 
A more principled problem is that an overwhelming variety of mechanisms 
operates on the level of individual artefacts, many or all of which involve human 
intentions. Even setting aside the specific complexities of validating intentional 
explanations, explanatory hypotheses are vastly underdetermined by the available 
evidence. The problem with archaeological explanations is not that few hypotheses fit 
the (scant) facts, but that there is a “superabundance” (Renfrew and Bahn 2004, 
p.469), with no principled way to prefer one explanation over the other. 
Do cladograms contribute to solving this difficulty? One might think they do. 
After all, they make a principled distinction between homologies and homoplasies. 
This means that some similarities are unlikely to be the result of independent 
invention, like homologies in biology are not cases of convergent evolution. Yet an 
abundance of explanatory mechanisms is left: homologies could be explained by 
strong material constraints on design, fixed (but false) technological knowledge about 
these constraints, strict master-apprentice relations, unchanging user preferences, to 
name but a few; likewise, homoplasies can be the result of – among other things – 
prestige or conformity bias among cultures, independent invention, and dependence 
between traits. Moreover, for any change in character state, one can appeal to changes 
in either design or use practices. 
One could counter that excluding one of many mechanisms would improve the 
explanatory situation. However, cladistic techniques might also overlook or downplay 
the importance of some mechanisms, causing loss of information. Here, on the 
individual level, the structural-misrepresentation objection appears to have some bite 
after all. Background knowledge tells us that, for instance, theft of ideas and 
modularity of design problems are significant forces on the individual level. The 
resulting similarities may, in the case of artefacts, jump over generations as old 
solutions to partial problems are borrowed. ‘Ordinary’ theft may appear on the 
cladistic radar, so to speak, as a homoplasy. Intergenerational theft and borrowing, 
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however, are unlikely to do so – and the more the situation resembles one of multiple 
ancestry, the less likely the situation is to be represented accurately. The problem is 
not that there is (too much or any) blending or reticulation, but that one might not see 
all there is to explain “on the cladistic radar”. It is an open question whether this 
limited misrepresentation objection holds true. Tests with small, experimentally 
controlled tool traditions need to show to what extent the strong modularity and 
material constraints inherent in many technologies undermine the representational 
accuracy of cladograms.
12
 Without successful tests, the possibility of neglecting 
significant individual-level mechanisms in phylogenetic reconstructions should give 
one pause in applying these reconstructions for explanatory purposes. 
One might therefore seek strength in numbers, i.e., pitch explanations at the 
population level. Indeed, the promise made by evolutionary archaeologists (quoted in 
section 3) seems to be that the abundance of individual-level mechanisms may be 
replaced with the population-level mechanisms of evolutionary theory. 
To move to the population level, the items that are subjected to phylogenetic 
analysis should be artefact types rather than individual tokens. Suppose that this 
choice, non-standard in archaeology, could be made in some uncontroversial manner. 
Even then, given the present state of our knowledge, the phylogenetic reconstruction 
would contribute little to population-level archaeological explanations. The reason is 
that one cannot simply assume or postulate that populations of material artefacts 
evolve by natural selection. The seminal work on dual-inheritance models of human 
cultural evolution by Boyd and Richerson (1985) shows that some cultural items, such 
as child-bearing practices, may evolve by natural selection, even without genetic 
replication mechanisms, under specific conditions. Their results carefully distinguish 
selective forces such as conformity bias, operating on (the adoption of) individual 
cultural items, from natural selection, which operates on a population level. 
                                                 
12
 Tëmkin and Eldredge (2007) suggest that their reconstruction of instrument traditions is a 
demonstration of inaccuracy, not just of the reticulated shape of the tree of technology. However, they 
conclude the former from the latter: low phylogenetic signal in the data is taken as an indication that 
cladistic techniques misrepresent the true historical relations. This need not be the case, since the 
(many) homoplasies in a low-CI cladogram could be taken to represent horizontal transmission. The 
question is rather whether similarities known to be due to horizontal transmission are correctly 
reconstructed as homoplasies. The more consistent accuracy tests in (Eerkens et al. 2006) likewise 
focus on how simplified transmission systems lower consistency indexes to that obtained for a random 
data set. But again, inaccuracies might also arise for acceptable consistency indexes, because of 
specific individual-level mechanisms at work in the design and use of technology. 
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Their results do not automatically extend to material culture. Many advocates 
of theories of cultural evolution, including Boyd and Richerson, define culture so 
broadly that it includes technical artefacts as well as religious systems and hunting 
techniques. Yet artefacts might have some distinctive features, like the 
aforementioned strong modularity and material constraints. Moreover, many artefacts 
are embedded in multiple use practices: one person’s hunting knife may be another 
person’s razorblade. To show that the results of Boyd and Richerson extend to 
material culture, one would need to study systematically how their various selective 
forces may be affected by these features, and which supplementary forces might be 
needed. Only after these changes have been properly incorporated in their dual-
inheritance models, it could be studied under which conditions, if at all, populations 
of artefacts evolve. 
There have as yet been no attempts at this modelling by evolutionary 
archaeologists.
13
 My point is not that these models cannot be constructed, or that their 
results will be negative. Rather, it is that without these models (or others like them), it 
cannot be said which mechanisms are responsible for the historical relations between 
artefact types which would be ‘revealed’ by a population-level phylogenetic 
reconstruction. Given the availability of software packages like PAUP, it is possible 
to generate such a reconstruction, which has every appearance of a result in 
archaeology. Yet explaining the shape of the cladogram is not be a gruelling job, as in 
the individual-level case, but – at least at present – a shot in the dark. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Constructing cladograms from morphological data seems a discipline-neutral 
operation. Applicability results in archaeology have indeed shown that parsimony-
based methods (and the software in which it is implemented) travel unscathed from 
biology to the study of technical artefacts. I have argued, however, that the resulting 
reconstructions of phylogenetic traditions do not travel as well; a meaningful result in 
one disciplinary context may be of dubious value in another, although it has been 
                                                 
13
 There have been attempts to connect population-level mechanisms to (types of) artefact features. In 
particular, natural selection was claimed to operate on functional features and drift on stylistic features 
(Dunnell 1978). This function-style distinction is highly problematic (Hurt and Rakita 2001). 
Moreover, in the absence of models of relevant selective forces operating on functional and stylistic 
features, claims about mechanisms operating on popu
 16 
gained by applying the same method. Disciplinary context affects phylogenetic 
analyses of tool traditions in several ways. First, they are supposed to contribute to 
explanation of the archaeological record rather than classification, since the latter is 
thought to be a matter of prior stipulation. Second, there is an unresolved, implicit 
ambiguity in the explanations sought – individual-level or population-level – which 
affects both the construction of cladograms and their interpretation. Third, on either 
explanatory level, cladograms contribute little to outstanding questions: on the 
individual level, few relevant mechanisms can be excluded from consideration on the 
basis of phylogenetic reconstructions, and the operation of some mechanisms may be 
systematically overlooked; on the population level, interpreting cladograms is mere 
speculation as long as it has not been established which mechanisms operate on 
classes of artefacts. 
These conclusions are critical about existing work on tool traditions. It does, 
however, identify what I regard as some real research challenges and choices faced by 
evolutionary archaeology. Moreover, the conclusions do not entail that phylogenetic 
analysis cannot be applied successfully and productively outside of biology. Such 
applications may, for instance, be limited to extensions of the comparative method to 
studies of cultural evolution; there, reconstructions of tool traditions do not contribute 
directly to explanations, but they are relevant for checking dependencies in data sets 
and assessing the strength of correlations. 
Another suggestion concerns the method for phylogenetic reconstruction. The 
current preference for parsimony-based methods, combined with the idea that 
cladograms can be constructed before they are interpreted, perhaps needs to be 
reconsidered. Alternatives are approaches based on Bayesianism, or on model-
selection approaches to statistical inference. These methods are, to a large extent, 
ordinally equivalent to parsimony, i.e., they generate the same reconstructions (Sober 
2008, Ch.4). Generating reconstructions, however, may be unproductive in 
archaeology, given the superabundance of mechanisms. Instead, one might try to test 
explanatory hypotheses by means of phylogenetic analyses. This reverses the two-step 
procedure proposed by evolutionary archaeologists and aligns with work in biology, 
in which the relevance of phylogenetic analysis for hypothesis testing was shown 
(e.g., Huelsenbeck and Rannala 1997; Johnson and Omland 2004). It would be 
worthwhile to examine whether this relevance can be extended to archaeology, along 
with the analytic methods used.
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